My PhD thesis puts into play a lot of different areas of philosophy which I have found fascinating for a long time, although I can't (yet!) focus on all.
For example, in philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology: what is the nature of belief, how, if at all, does it parallel that of pretence. What is the nature of imagination and its different kinds? Can we make a case for imagination and belief to be the same sub-kind of state (this is roughly my current project)? What are the metacognitive processes that regulate our mental states and what social factors impact those ?
In philosophy of action: what do answers to the previous questions tell us about how we are motivated to act; what can we learn from this concerning motivation, and the possibility of, joint action.
In epistemology: What positive contributions can imagination make towards our knowledge of reality and possibilities? How wide-spread is the role that imagination plays in granting knowledge of reality? What is the impact of these findings on the value of testimony and how to protect ourselves from potential epistemic abuses due to the close connections.
In logic and metaphysics: What is the best account of counterfactuals? How best to distinguish between supposition, conceivability and imagination? Do they overlap?
In moral and political philosophy and its intersection with philosophy of language: What is conceptual engineering? What impact on social reality can it have? Why, and how, does propaganda work?
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